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5 Decentring European higher 
education governance
The construction of expertise in the 
Bologna Process
Dorota Dakowska
Introduction
Higher education governance was constructed as a decentred policy sector. On 
the one hand, the EU merely plays a supportive role while the member states 
retain their formal prerogatives over this policy area. On the other hand, accord-
ing to the principle of university autonomy, government intervention in the 
universities’ organisational, financial and academic functioning should be 
limited. In practice, states still regulate the higher education (HE) sector. Mean-
while, since the launch of the Lisbon Strategy, the European Commission has 
played an increasing role in supporting and directly participating in the formally 
intergovernmental Bologna Process.
 This contribution will shed light on higher education governance in Europe, 
and especially how the European Commission (Commission) strategically 
attempts to shape a policy area in which it formally has few prerogatives through 
supporting stakeholder organisations and experts groups. The Commission’s 
efforts at ‘governing from a distance’ (Epstein, 2005) is meant to encourage 
national authorities to pursue the implementation of HE reforms. Through the 
material, political and symbolic support it provides to reformist groups and indi-
viduals, the Commission seeks to generate its own clientele, and to legitimate 
professional networks that will promote European schemes at the domestic level. 
While much has been said on the emergence of a European HE policy (Bache, 
2006; Kehm et al., 2009; Capano and Piattoni, 2011) and on policy implementa-
tion on the domestic level (Stastna, 2001; Rozsnyai, 2003; Witte, 2006; Gor-
nitzka, 2007; Yagci, 2010), decentring the analytical focus on the brokers that 
act as intermediaries between the EU and domestic level offers a more refined 
view of HE governance.
 The case of European higher education policy seems well- suited to a decen-
tred analytical perspective since it involves a variety of actors who struggle over 
the legitimate interpretation of the purpose and nature of HE reforms. As the 
decentred approach to governance rejects the reification of concepts such as the 
state or nation – but also less aggregated notions such as stakeholders or experts 
– it is a good fit for the European political space – and to the so- called European 
Higher Education Area. Both of them appear to be, par excellence, ‘constructed, 
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transnational, differentiated and discontinuous’ (Bevir, 2013, p. 13). One par-
ticularly insightful aspect of the interpretative approach is its focus on the emer-
gence of a dominant discourse and its use by hegemonic groups. As Frank 
Fischer argues,
the creation of social knowledge and power are intimately linked. To act 
together, a human community must come to some agreement on what vision 
of reality it will accept as both factually correct and normatively legitimate. 
Such rhetorical closure on the definition of reality establishes the foundation 
of social order,
(Fischer, 1995, pp. 208–209)
and allows some groups to take precedence over others. Following this logic, 
European higher education policy results from a ‘co- evolution of supranational 
and inter- governmental policy initiatives marked by power struggles, competi-
tion, and strategic convergence’ (Dakowska and Serrano- Velarde, 2018, p. 261).
 Education policies are coproduced by actors situated at different levels. My 
contribution to this area of study focuses on expert groups that are not exclu-
sively Brussels- based. To understand the complex governance of HE, it is 
important to take into account both the European dimension (funds, pro-
grammes and working groups) and the domestic dimension, and in the process 
to grasp the relationship between the expert groups at the EU level and the 
national policy- making system. Although they act primarily at the domestic 
level, the Bologna Experts are financed by EU funds. As my comparative ana-
lysis of the French, Polish and Ukrainian cases shows, while they might poten-
tially serve as mediators between the European Commission (DG Education 
and Culture and its executive agency) and the domestic level, their policy 
leverage varies dramatically.
 The empirical cases analysed in greater detail here focus on a group of experts 
that has been launched and supported by the European Commission: the Bologna 
Experts (in the EU member states), also called Higher Education Reform Experts 
(in the EU neighbourhood). From the perspective of HE governance in Europe, 
these academic experts can first be considered as brokers between domestic and 
European political fields. Second, comparison between the three country cases 
shows significant difference in the practices and policy positions of these indi-
viduals and thus stresses the need to decentre the analytical perspective on the 
Bologna Process. Far from driving policy convergence, the process should be 
understood in terms of its diversity, including the historical conditions of each 
country’s membership in relation to the EU.1
 This contribution contrasts with the bulk of research on HE governance in 
several ways. First, instead of focusing exclusively on the EU or the domestic 
level, the focus on the meso- level of policy brokers helps us refine the analytical 
conceptualisation of the relations between the Commission and its so- called 
stakeholders. Second, it tries to refine the usually top- down oriented Europeani-
sation studies and suggests a bottom- up, dynamic and sociological approach. 
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84  Dorota Dakowska
Manja Klemenčič (2013) defines Europeanisation as a policy adaptation and 
examines ‘to what extent national policy developments reflect the European 
recommendations on institutional diversification’ (p. 120). Instead of appre-
hending HE reforms as a unilateral adaptation to an external constraint, as the 
literature on Europeanisation and policy diffusion calls us to (Börzel and 
Risse, 2000), I propose to examine the relations between the European institu-
tions and national academic spaces in their reciprocity, focusing both on actors 
and on their practices. In doing so, I follow a sociological and constructivist 
approach of the European political field (Georgakakis, 2012; Guiraudon and 
Favel, 2011) as it interacts with domestic political arenas. The political soci-
ology approach to the EU that has been developed over the last decade adopts 
a bottom- up perspective as it sheds light empirically and inductively on actor 
configurations and power relations in the construction of public ‘problems’ 
(Rowell and Mangenot, 2010).
 This chapter is based on empirical fieldwork carried out in Poland, France, 
Germany and Ukraine as well as in Brussels. It includes the analysis of different 
types of documents related to the reforms (legal acts, published and unpublished 
reports, communications and press articles) and 85 semi- structured interviews 
conducted with educational experts, representatives of the academic community 
and top civil servants at national, European and international levels (European 
Commission, Council of Europe, OECD, UNESCO).2 Consultation of the 
Council of Europe and UNESCO archives complemented the empirical part of 
the research.
 The chapter is structured as follows. I first consider the evolution of European 
higher education governance and the changing role of the European Commis-
sion. Second, I reflect on the role and uses of expertise in European higher 
education governance and outline how the European Commission tends to struc-
ture its environment and ‘clientele’ in HE matters and how it shapes the Bologna 
Experts group. Third, I present a more detailed and collective portrait of the 
Bologna Experts in France, Poland and the Ukraine and reflect on their domestic 
policy leverage.
European higher education governance and the Bologna 
Process
The rise of a European HE policy must be situated in a broader international 
context characterised by the involvement of international organisations such as 
the OECD, the Council of Europe, UNESCO and the World Bank in this sector 
(Martens et al., 2007; Dakowska and Serrano- Velarde, 2018). Education has 
only become a subject of scrutiny in EU policy- making analysis relatively 
recently (Jakobi et al., 2009), since it wasn’t historically an area of Community 
intervention. Still, closer examination reveals a historical interest in the educa-
tion field among Community representatives, followed by a growing involve-
ment of the Commission, prompted by the opportunities offered by the 
Maastricht and Lisbon Treaties.
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The progressive emergence of a European higher education policy
Although under the Treaty of Rome member state governments formally retained 
their legal competences in educational policies, the Commission took a number 
of initiatives based on its competence in vocational education (art. 128). At the 
beginning of the European integration process, attempts were already made to 
set up a European university (Corbett, 2005; Croché, 2010). The European 
University Institute in Florence was initiated in 1972, while in 1974 a Resolution 
of the Ministers of Education established a division for higher education within 
the Commission’s Directorate- General for Research, Science and Education and 
laid out some principles of intergovernmental cooperation in the field (Neave 
1984). Since 1986 the Commission has promoted mobility through its Erasmus 
programme. It has worked at introducing a ‘European Dimension in Higher 
Education’ with its Jean Monnet actions as well as the Tempus programmes. The 
Treaty of Maastricht (1992) recognised education as an area of EU competence, 
stating that the EU
shall contribute to the development of quality education by encouraging 
cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, by supporting and 
supplementing their action, while fully respecting the responsibility of the 
Member States for the content of teaching and the organization of education 
systems.
(Art. 126, later art. 165.1 of TFUE)
This specified and further legitimised the EU’s action in the field, as the Com-
mission was allowed to back member state initiatives (Dakowska and Serrano- 
Velarde, 2018). Within the Commission, policy entrepreneurs made efforts to 
secure a ‘Community competence for the non- Treaty sector of education’ 
(Corbett, 2005, p. 155). The idea that higher education was to produce a highly 
skilled workforce, just as vocational training did, was the foundation of Com-
mission activism in the 1980s and in the following decades. This clarifies why 
Commission representatives consider the Bologna Process and the Lisbon strategy’s 
educational provisions as two sides of the same coin.
 The Bologna Process, launched in 1999 as an intergovernmental initiative of 
29 countries, was first a voluntary process that aimed at creating a European 
Higher Education Area by strengthening student mobility, harmonising degrees 
and promoting quality assurance. The Bologna Process has inspired numerous 
research programmes on the Europeanisation of higher education (HE) (Amaral 
et al., 2009; Dale and Robertson, 2009; Curaj et al., 2012). These studies have 
turned academic attention to the domestic level, looking at diverse adaptations of 
the intergovernmental Bologna Process recommendations in different contexts.
 The launch of the Lisbon Strategy (2000) appears to have been a turning point 
for European higher education polices, which became explicitly connected to 
economic and social objectives (Capano and Piattoni, 2011). In Lisbon, the 
European Council called on Europe to become ‘the most competitive and 
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dynamic knowledge- based economy in the world, capable of sustainable eco-
nomic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion’ (Lisbon 
European Council, 2000). While the link between education, research and eco-
nomic development was a constant in the European Commission’s approach to 
the sector, the launch of the Lisbon Strategy led to the introduction of a new 
method (the Open Method of Coordination) in which the member states had to 
report on their progress towards meeting common goals. Also, the discursive 
link between higher education and employability had since become much more 
explicit in the Commission’s documents. Cussó’s (2008) lexicometric analysis 
shows that the term ‘knowledge society’ reflected a socio- economic paradigm 
enhanced by terms such as ‘work’, ‘employment’ and ‘skills’, which revealed 
the Commission’s priority of ‘education’s adaptation to the job market needs by 
developing strategic skills and by the increasing of private investments’ (Cussó 
2008, p. 51). Under the Juncker Commission, in office since 2014, ‘skills’ have 
been transferred from the Directorate- general for Education and Culture to the 
DG for Employment, Social affairs and Inclusion (DG EMPL), which further 
illustrates this logic.3 The New Skills Agenda, which refers to educational 
matters, was elaborated by DG EMPL.
 The launch of the Lisbon Strategy put mounting pressure on the intergovern-
mental Bologna Process. Kathia Serrano- Velarde (2014) has shown how the 
slogan of a European ‘knowledge economy’ promoted by the Lisbon Strategy 
has been strategically used by EC officials to enhance the Commission’s visibil-
ity in this field. Formally, the intergovernmental Bologna Process differs from 
the EU schemes both legally and geographically as it encompasses a wide range 
of states that are not EU members, especially post- Soviet countries. Still, the 
European Commission has played an increasingly active role in supporting and 
directly participating in the Bologna Process (Bache, 2006; Keeling, 2006). This 
became clear in 2003, when the Commission was invited to join the board of the 
Bologna Follow Up Group (BFUG). On the one hand, some attempts were made 
by national representatives, especially in the initial phase, to defend the auto-
nomy of the Bologna Process, which led a few authors to describe the process as 
a case of ‘resisting the EU’ (Muller and Ravinet, 2008). However, these attempts 
seem to be limited to a few individual country representatives and do not reflect 
a broad ideological convergence between the Commission representatives and 
most stakeholders and country representatives. Their material resources, but also 
the dependence of the stakeholders, have increased due to the Commission’s 
lavish financial support. By supporting the stakeholder groups and the activities 
of the Bologna Process (conferences, meetings, reports) so generously, the Com-
mission contributes to the material existence of the process. In this context, two 
intertwined Commission strategies can be mentioned. The first strategy is a dis-
cursive, rhetorical and political takeover of the Bologna Process. The second one 
consists in funding applied research and expert groups in order to deepen and 
speed up the process.
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The Commission’s discursive and material colonisation of the 
Bologna Process
In the policy discourse produced by the Commission, the intergovernmental spe-
cificity and autonomy of the Bologna Process tend to be denied insofar as the 
Bologna Process is presented as a complement to the Lisbon Strategy and to the 
Copenhagen Process, which focuses on vocational education. The Commission 
representatives claim their authority in policy areas that have been discussed 
within the Bologna framework such as quality assurance or the qualification 
frameworks. This creates tensions, as other participants in the Bologna Process, 
including representatives of the Council of Europe, have pointed out:
Quality assurance is also problematic because the European Commission 
issued a position paper in October, immediately after the Noordwijk 
meeting, which goes far in the direction of giving the Commission a deci-
sive role in quality assurance. It has, however, been reported that many EU 
countries have expressed strong doubts about this proposal (…)
Another problematic issue is that the Commission has also published a 
calendar for elaborating a European qualifications framework encompassing 
both higher education and vocational education and training (VET) that 
could be seen as preempting the discussions within the Bologna Process on 
qualifications framework for the EHEA.4
The analysis of the archives from the initial period of the Bologna Process 
reveals that the Commission’s attempt to subordinate the Bologna initiatives and 
schemes to its policy priorities are not a recent phenomenon. As it launched pilot 
projects in the area of quality assurance in the beginning of the 1990, the Com-
mission set in motion policy trends that were later carried on during the Bologna 
Process.5 In the Bologna Follow- Up Group’s 2005 report to the Conference of 
European Ministers in Bergen, the chapter on ‘Participating international institu-
tions and organisations’ illustrates the articulation between the Bologna Process 
and the Lisbon Strategy.
The Bologna process coincides with Commission policy in higher education 
supported through the European programmes and notably Socrates- Erasmus. 
From an EU perspective, the Bologna process fits into the broader Lisbon 
Strategy, launched in March 2000.6
The intertwining of vocational and higher education as well as the Lisbon 
Strategy and the Bologna Process is also evident in the more direct financial 
support to higher education reforms. In this respect, the Commission plays a 
structuring role. The Commission provides material and intellectual support to 
the Bologna Process. It has encouraged the creation of a European Qualification 
Framework. The Commission’s funding of Bologna- related forums, conferences, 
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expert and working groups reflects its political will to push the process forward. 
Nowadays, the EU- funded programmes are a major source of revenues for the 
Brussels- based stakeholder organisations representing students, youth, higher 
education institutions and those promoting EU policy priorities such as ‘lifelong 
learning’. The wide array of funding schemes for higher education highlights the 
Commission’s role as a key player in both vocational and higher education pol-
icies. While the Commission’s material investments are presented as a neutral 
means to ‘promote’ the European Higher Education Area, these funds express 
strategic political choices.
From an EU perspective, there is also an obvious link between the Bologna 
Process and the Copenhagen Process on enhanced European co- operation in 
Vocational education and training, launched in December 2002. The Com-
mission has taken several initiatives to establish synergies between both 
processes in important fields such as transparency of qualifications (EURO-
PASS), Credit Transfer, Quality Assurance and the European Qualifications 
Framework (EQF ).7
Still, the Commission’s role in educational policies, as in other areas that come 
under the Open Method of Coordination, has been extensively debated. 
Approaching this from a decentred perspective allow us to go beyond the general 
debates on the absolute weight of the European Commission in educational 
matters. The bulk of the academic literature on the topic has been EU- centred. A 
critical strand of analysis sheds light on the growing involvement of the Com-
mission in the formally intergovernmental BFUG, thus suggesting that the 
Bologna Process was ‘steered’ by the Commission (Croché, 2010). Although 
stimulating, this research focuses on the Commission as the main spiritus 
movens of educational reforms. In a more bottom- up perspective, it is possible to 
analyse the Commission’s growing ties with representatives of academia, 
Brussels- based stakeholders and EU- funded expert groups that build on the trust 
forged during their long- term involvement in EU programs.
Governing European higher education through expertise
Experts have become essential links between the EU institutions and the aca-
demic community. The political uses of expert knowledge have been the subject 
of several publications (Boswell, 2009), including ones focused on Europe (cf. 
Saurugger, 2002; Gornitzka and Sverdrup, 2008, 2015). In this body of research, 
expertise is analysed both as a means of administration and legitimisation allow-
ing the Commission to forge alliances in order to better shape its environment 
(Robert, 2013; 2015). Concerning the transformations of HE in Europe, some 
authors have looked into the functioning of national expert groups at European 
level, such as the Bologna Follow Up Group (Lažetić, 2010) or into groups set 
up as part of the Open Method of Coordination, such as those in charge of ‘peer 
learning activities’ (Lange and Alexiadou, 2010). Furthermore, the structuration 
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of expertise may be a pertinent avenue for the detailed analysis of the rapproche-
ments and transfers that take place between the OECD and the European Com-
mission (Normand, 2010; Lawn and Grek, 2012). This dynamic approach to 
expertise – and to its uses by the European Commission (Woll and Jacquot, 
2010) – gives us an understanding of European governance as a case of copro-
duction of policies between the domestic and the European level. The political 
sociology approach to the EU field has proposed a meticulous critical survey of 
the population of experts, their skills, careers and trajectories (Robert, 2013, 
2015; Michel, 2005).
 It is worth asking to what extent HE experts – who have benefitted from the 
Commission’s recognition – take advantage of their proximity with the Euro-
pean institutions and networks to ask national decision- makers to implement 
policy instruments and goals elaborated by the European working groups and 
authorised during the ministerial meetings. I argue that the promotion of external 
schemes provides some experts with new resources and opportunities and, 
accordingly, reshapes the power relations within the HE field. However, the rel-
ative degrees of empowerment of the Bologna Experts and their policy leverage 
vary depending on the country’s situation within the European Union, their gov-
ernment’s eagerness to implement the European recommendations and experts’ 
more or less high or low ranking position in the HE governance of their country.
Grasping expertise and rethinking influence
Scholarship on expertise and policy- making has focused on the question of 
experts’ influence (Klüver, 2013). However, influence is a tricky term that is dif-
ficult to define and to measure. The influence of the Commission- funded experts 
is uncertain, it cannot be decreed; it must be examined carefully on a case- by-
case basis. Rather than focusing on influence as the possibility for a group to 
modify policy outcomes, this contribution argues that influence can be under-
stood in a more relational sense, by analysing the policy positionings of the 
experts under study and their agenda- setting potentials. The comparison between 
different domestic cases reveals a considerable variation between countries.
 One way to understand the European expert groups is to portray them as epi-
stemic communities, as they appear as knowledge- based groups that contribute 
to ‘articulating the cause- and-effect relationship of complex problems, helping 
states identify their interests, framing the issues for collective debates, proposing 
specific policies and identifying salient points for negotiation’ (Haas, 1992, p. 2). 
However, when we look more closely at the case of the Bologna Experts, the 
replication of this scheme seems to be uncertain. According to Haas, not only is 
an epistemic community ‘a network of professionals with recognised expertise 
and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy rel-
evant knowledge within that domain or issue area’, but it is bound by a ‘shared 
belief or faith in the verity and the applicability of particular forms of knowledge 
or specific truths’ (Haas, 1992, p. 3). Though he admits a degree of diversity in 
their backgrounds, Haas considers, in a somewhat teleological way, that the 
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 individuals he analyses are by definition ‘strong actors at that national and inter-
national level’ who manage to consolidate ‘bureaucratic power within national 
administrations and international secretariats’ and who influence state interests, 
whether directly or indirectly (Ibid., p. 4). Moreover, the author attributes an all- 
encompassing role to the power of ideas and beliefs to the detriment of social, 
political and institutional resources and of changing actor configurations.
 The epistemic communities’ framework is not entirely apt in the case of the 
Bologna Experts, some of whom share common beliefs in the usefulness of spe-
cific transnationally promoted educational schemes such as learning outcomes or 
qualification frameworks, while others may become members of the group due 
to their status (such as the French student trade unions representatives) and are 
thus not necessarily experienced nor committed to the Bologna Process as a 
whole.
 The way in which the European Commission develops connections with its 
stakeholders calls for reconsidering the findings of Agnes Batory and Nicole 
Lindstrom. According to Batory and Lindstrom, the Commission’s pressure on 
national HE systems should be re- evaluated in the light of the ‘power of [its] 
purse’. The authors convincingly demonstrate how the formally ‘soft’ Open 
Method of Coordination (OMC) mechanisms contribute to a process that is 
eventually perceived as ‘fundamentally non negotiable’ by its participants 
(Batory and Lindstrom, 2011, p. 311). They point out the balance of power 
created by the Commission, in which the grant recipients, i.e. HEI, ‘lobby their 
governments from below to pass legislation’ (Batory and Lindstrom, 2011, 
p. 313).
 While these findings concerning the bypassing of the national level in order 
to conform to the Commission’s requirements are important and the study of its 
mechanisms requires additional investigation, I argue that the idea that ‘the 
Commission turns universities into agents for its policies’ should be further 
refined. This requires analysing the channels through which the impulsions from 
international and especially European forums are transmitted and translated to 
domestic policy- makers and to a broader academic community. Decentred theory 
helps to make sense of the differential attitudes to European recommendations 
by reminding us that ‘the policies a state adopts are not necessary responses to 
given pressures but a set of perceived solutions to one particular conception of 
these pressures’ (Bevir, 2013, p. 29).
EU financed experts: brokers between the Commission and domestic 
policy- makers
By supporting groups representing the academic community’s interests in Brus-
sels, the European Commission replicated an approach that has been observed in 
other fields. Through its contribution to the emergence and material development 
of interest groups, the Commission creates a supportive audience and a clientele 
of its own (Mazey and Richardson, 1993; Robert, 2013). The so- called E4 group 
organisations based in Brussels – European Students’ Union (ESU, former 
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ESIB), European University Association (EUA), EURASHE (European Associ-
ation of Institutions in Higher Education) and ENQA (European Association for 
Quality Assurance in Higher Education) – have an institutionalised position 
within the Bologna Process. At the same time, they are the Commission’s part-
ners in the field of HE. As the Commission welcomed their establishment and 
contributes to a large part of their budget, the proximity between these organisa-
tions and the Commission may be more important than between them and their 
local constituencies. Student representatives, who have been involved in Euro-
pean HE policy- making have in particular experienced upward trajectories. 
Many of these former student leaders have pursued their professional careers in 
the European HE field in one of the E4’s groups in Brussels. Some of them work 
in newly created bodies linked to the E4 such as the European Quality Assurance 
Register (EQAR), others as private consultants, domestic policy advisors or HE 
researchers. Over the last decade, new platforms and student organisations have 
received substantial EU funding. They are even more dependent on the Commis-
sion, as they do not have electoral representativeness and concentrate their action 
on promoting EU policies, such as the Erasmus Students Network and the Life-
long learning platform.8
 The reports ordered and supported by the Commission and produced by the 
E4 and other stakeholders active in the field of education document the way in 
which the Commission shapes expertise that suits its worldview and political pri-
orities. Working with the E4 representatives has several benefits for the Com-
mission: they appear as recognised partners acting as intermediaries with the 
academic community. Due to their material and intellectual dependence, the 
expertise they produce is largely in tune with the Commission’s political prior-
ities and categories of understanding. The Commission has supported surveys 
carried out by the EUA (Trends) as well as the ESU and reports on the percep-
tion of the Erasmus programme, which have been entrusted to the ESN.
 Considering that the Commission is involved in various events and groups 
that promote the Bologna Process, it appears that the everyday follow- up and 
dissemination of the Bologna recommendations would be hardly possible 
without the Commission’s support.
The Commission supports National Teams of Bologna Promoters, the pro-
duction of Bologna information and series of Bologna events, seminars and 
conferences, including the Glasgow Higher Education Convention of EUA 
and the Bergen Ministerial Conference.9
The HE experts – academics, former academics, students and administrators – 
have regular occasions to meet and communicate transnationally. It is worth 
asking what kind of relationship the Commission seeks to establish with national 
political and academic spheres through their intermediation. While some authors 
have advanced the hypothesis that they are a means to bypass domestic political 
processes using European funds and linkages (Batory and Lindstrom, 2011), the 
‘shortcut’ hypothesis needs refining. On the one hand, these scholars are right 
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when they argue that Commission representatives seek to create distinctive rela-
tionships and foster domestic policy dynamics to speed up some developments. 
On the other hand, the way in which these attempts are perceived and accepted – 
or not – depends on experts’ socialisation, on the domestic institutional realm 
and on political context. As Fischer points out, ‘the pursuit of scientific ques-
tions is also seen to be influenced by social perceptions, beliefs and motivation 
of members of the scientific community’ (Fischer, 2009, p. 112). All in all, it is 
important to examine not only the structure and characteristics of each expert 
group but also broader institutional features: the country’s position within/
towards the European Union, its position in the analysed policy stream (initiator 
or latecomer in the Bologna Process) and the domestic political context during 
the period under study (more or less favourable to European recommendations).
The Bologna Experts as educational entrepreneurs 
and brokers
This section situates Bologna- related expertise in the policy processes in France, 
Poland and Ukraine. It will investigate how the so- called Bologna Expert groups 
are set up and positioned between the European Commission and the national 
governments and how their policy leverage can be defined.
 The National Teams of Bologna Promoters, later called Bologna Experts, 
were set up by the European Commission in 2004 in the European Union and 
EEA countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) as well as the EU candidate 
countries. The teams of Bologna Experts included around 150 to 200 people 
altogether. The initiative slowed down after 2013 and was discontinued in 2015. 
The Higher Education Reform Experts (HEREs) reflect the geographical duality 
of the Bologna Process (2005), as they were set up after the inclusion of new 
countries from Eastern Europe, Central Asia and Caucasus. Following a similar 
model, the HERE teams operate in the EU neighbouring countries including the 
Western Balkans, post- Soviet Europe and the Southern Mediterranean area. 
They are financed by the Erasmus+ programme.
While the European Commission is responsible for the general steering of the 
HEREs’ initiative in accordance with its political priorities, the EACEA is 
responsible for approving and monitoring the HEREs’ activities and ensuring 
a coherent and coordinated approach for all the 27 countries concerned.10
Both groups of experts (Bologna Experts and HERE) were financed by EU funds 
channelled through the Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency 
(EACEA). At the domestic level, the National Eramsus+ Offices coordinate the 
HERE teams and support them administratively, logistically and financially 
under the supervision of the EU delegations. Due to their brokerage potential 
between the EU and the domestic political field, the Bologna Expert groups are 
an original vantage point from which to observe the domestic uses of European 
recommendations and schemes.
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Becoming a Bologna Expert
The composition of Bologna Expert groups is formally the result of a dialogue 
between the EU Delegation, the EACEA and the national authorities. The HERE 
national teams are composed of 5 to 15 members according to the size of the 
country. The Ukrainian National Team of Higher Education Reform Experts 
(HERE) is meant ‘to provide a pool of expertise in certain areas to promote and 
enhance progress towards the Lisbon and Bologna objectives in the light of 
national needs and aspirations’.11 This European dimension as well as their pre-
viously established links with the Commission have played a noticeable role in 
the nomination of these experts. First of all, former participation in a 
Commission- funded European education programme seems to be a common 
characteristic of the experts nominated in all three analysed countries. Several 
members of these groups have already participated in European exchange pro-
grammes such as Tempus, Erasmus Mundus or in European expert groups and 
networks before their nomination as Bologna Experts/HERE. In Poland and 
Ukraine, participation in the Tempus (Trans European Mobility Programme for 
University Studies) programme since the 1990s was a founding experience to 
the future experts, both in terms of social capital, knowledge accumulation and 
socialisation.12 The Tempus programme, which a Polish expert called ‘the best 
invested EU funds’ in his country, has played a structuring role in transforming 
the HE landscape.13 The programme helped develop closer ties and expand 
knowledge transfers between universities from Eastern and Western Europe. It 
facilitated the emergence and consolidation of groups of reformers who insti-
gated change within their home universities; it encouraged socialisation and the 
dissemination of knowledge on HE reforms.
 Several characteristics distinguish these experts who have worked in the 
Bologna promoters’ group since the beginning from their counterparts. The 
experience in promoting the internationalisation of faculties and the administra-
tion of their HEI since the 1990s is a main common characteristic. In Poland, 
they have promoted students’ mobility, the two- tier system and English- language 
courses. Owing to this engagement, some of these individuals established ties 
with the Commission well before the launch of the Bologna Process. Some of 
them earned the Commission’s label of ‘ECTS- DS Counsellors’ as a result of 
their efforts in promoting the ECTS and Diploma Supplement in their HEI.
 In the French case, some core members of the Bologna Experts team had a 
shared experience of participation in the Commission- funded Tuning programme. 
Launched in 2000, Tuning was meant to support the Bologna Process by defining 
the curricula in terms of skills, in the name of ‘transparency, comparability and 
compatibility of study programmes’.14 These multiple linkages illustrate the way in 
which the Commission manages transnational expert groups. Those individuals 
who were familiar with the Commission’s methodology and professional jargon 
were able to easily adapt to the new expertise situation and reproduce their 
working methods in the context of the Bologna Process. However, these Europe-
anised specialists, trained to harmonise curricula and redefine them transnationally 
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in terms of skills had in some cases limited leverage at the national level, as one of 
the French participants explains:
This was one of Tuning’s weaknesses as we had worked by disciplinary 
field – we defined the famous skills – but we neglected to make the repre-
sentatives of different disciplines meet at the national level (…) so we saw 
each other in Brussels, there were three big working events – but even at 
lunch we tended to stay with colleagues from the same discipline. This was 
OK for Tuning but for after Tuning (…) this harmed Tuning’s future 
because when we ended up alone at the national level – well, we were really 
alone.
(Interview with a former Bologna Expert, 16 February 2016)
The launch of the Bologna promoters (later: experts) group thus appeared as a 
new opportunity to repurpose Europeanised expertise accumulated within the 
Tuning programme.
Tuning’s lucky break was in 2002, when the famous Bologna Promoters 
were put in place, Waagener from Groningen and the colleague from 
Deusto, Gonzalez [both leaders of the Tuning programme] said ‘we have 
absolutely to make sure that we have some “Tuning” guys nominated among 
the Bologna Experts’.
(Interview with a former Bologna Expert, 16 February 2016)
Beyond these uses of European resources, the case of the Bologna Experts show-
cases the importance of the political and administrative elites’ perception of their 
country’s position in the European education space. In the case of an old member 
state such as France, domestic policymakers sometimes observed the Commis-
sion’s activism in the field of educational policies with wariness, which did not 
necessarily play in favour of the EU- financed experts. On the contrary, in a EU 
neighbourhood country such as Ukraine, whose domestic political elites sought 
to tighten political links with the EU and depended heavily on external advice, 
expert groups endowed with EU funding and legitimacy appear much more 
central to the policy process. I will consider the extent to which these experts 
used their position and institutional connections to participate in translating 
Bologna policy lines and EU schemes in the domestic academic spaces.
 The analysis of the Bologna Experts (BE) provides a sociological insight into 
the relative levels of importance ascribed to Bologna – and Commission related 
expertise at the domestic level.15 The comparison between the French, Polish and 
Ukrainian groups sheds light both on their political resources (relative closeness 
or distance to the policy process) and on the domestic framing of European 
policy- making. The comparison between the three groups should not mask the 
differences either in context or in the political objectives and capabilities of these 
groups. As EU member states, Poland and France have a closer relationship with 
the Commission as they have to present their semesterly policy reports required 
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by the Europe 2020 strategy. Ukraine’s relations with the EU are shaped by the 
association treaty and the neighbourhood policy. Concerning the Bologna 
Process, France was one of the four initiators of the Sorbonne declaration and, 
together with Poland, one of the signatory states of the Bologna declaration. 
Ukraine joined the process later in 2005.
The Bologna Experts’ unequal policy leverage
The members of the Bologna Expert groups may be considered as potential 
intermediaries between the European level, public authorities and HEI.16 Their 
policy impact was difficult to pinpoint. In an evaluation of the scheme in 2012, 
the Commission had to admit there was ‘little evidence of the impacts of the 
National teams at the institutional level and no visible impact at system level’.17 
While it is obviously difficult to connect the experts’ activity and their policy 
impact, and not useful from a social science perspective to reproduce an evalu-
ative and prescriptive approach, a sociological look at the morphology/composition 
of the group helps taking into account the differences between the domestic 
cases. A comparative portrait of the Bologna- related experts shows that the pro-
portion of lecturers and researchers in each group varies: there was a large 
majority of academic lecturers and researchers in the Polish group (22, versus 
only 3 administrative staff members and 4 student representatives). In Ukraine, 
the lecturers and researchers are also in the majority, but they are more difficult 
to classify, as in many cases they have accepted important institutional and polit-
ical duties; the proportion of administrative staff and students was similar (22–4–4). 
On the contrary, in the French database, under half of the members were lectur-
ers and researchers; the rest represented administrative staff and students 
(13–12–10). In the French group, vocational establishments seem to be overrep-
resented. These mostly private engineering and business schools have more 
resources per student, and accordingly can afford to second administrative staff 
to European working groups; moreover, they pursue ambitious international-
isation policies. Still, general information about status does not tell us much 
unless we look at hierarchies and responsibilities in greater detail. In Ukraine, 
the lecturers and researchers seconded to the HERE group tend to have higher 
positions at the university and at the institutional level than their Polish and 
French counterparts. This could indicate the relative importance accorded in 
Ukraine to the Bologna Process at the academic level, and its eagerness to 
answer the Commission’s call to put high- ranking academic representatives in 
the group.
 Another indicator on the leverage of group members and the importance 
attached to these EU- funded groups domestically is the type of institutional 
duties assumed by the group’s representatives. Only in Ukraine has the HERE 
team systematically included top ministry executives such as the vice minister of 
Education in charge of Higher Education.18 The Ukrainian team generally 
included the head of the international relations department at the Ministry of 
Education. Since 2015, the presence of an officer from the Verkhovna Rada 
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(Parliament) enables direct access to the legislative process (especially as several 
members of the team were involved in the law- making process).19
 Concerning the proximity to the policymaking process, the comparison shows 
significant differences between the three case studies. Some of the Bologna 
Experts were asked to participate in ministerial or parliamentary working groups 
at the domestic level: this policy leverage was noticeable in the Polish and 
Ukrainian case but almost completely absent in France. In Ukraine, several 
HEREs were involved in the writing of the new law on HE for the parliamentary 
committee on Education. Also in Poland, several members of the group known 
as specialists of European rules and standards were consulted by the ministry 
(sometimes the minister herself ) and participated in expert groups set up at the 
national level. This affiliation – combined with the financing provided by the 
Commission – provides the experts with a certain amount of leverage. The situ-
ation was quite different in France, where the Bologna Experts were not directly 
associated to the policy process. A majority of the French team members did not 
have any political or administrative responsibilities at the ministerial level.20 In 
some cases, national policymakers were reportedly reluctant to include this 
group, which they could perceive negatively as an attempt by the Commission to 
interfere in the domestic policymaking process.21
 Another factor to the detriment of Bologna Experts noted in France and 
Poland relates to the fact that their policy advice was sought less by public 
universities and more by private institutions. This caused some ethical problems, 
raised by some experts.
At first, we were supposed to disseminate the Bologna Process tools. But, I 
will always remember, the only – the only institutions (…) that contacted us 
were private business schools! Who wanted absolutely to get the label! I 
remember that famous ECTS label (…) at first, we got demands only from 
private institutes to this extent that this raised ethical issues for us. We were 
funded by the European Commission. I mean, we did not turn down work 
for private firms but still, our mission was essentially to work with the 
public sector. I remember, the last ECTS label we gave to an osteology 
school from Lyon, who had called us.
(Interview with a former Bologna Expert, 16 February 2016)
In Poland, some of the team members are aware of the side effects of Bologna- 
related reforms such as the multiplication of private counselling firms, who sell 
their services to HEI.
Well, it’s a self- sustaining system that provides jobs to many people, cash to 
many people. When you look at the money that is spent on training (…) 
You know, there have been many private firms created in Poland for train-
ing. I know because they write to me, there are projects, EU funds for this 
and that and you know, when you write a project it is well regarded if you 
offer training. (…) We have asked in the Ministry as it is a moral dilemma 
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for us, (…) whether we as Bologna Experts can participate in that and the 
answer of the minister [secretary of state for HE] was yes, there is no collu-
sion of any kind.
(Interview with a Polish Bologna Expert, 2013)
The material aspect should not be underestimated. The financial compensation 
paid to experts for their daily involvement in explaining the Bologna Process 
(around €100) is symbolic in France and modest (though not insignificant) in 
Poland when compared with other, private opportunities. However, in Ukraine, 
where university teachers may earn officially about €150 per month, this is an 
extremely sizeable addition to their pay.
Conclusion
This study has taken a decentred approach to the study of the Bologna Experts, 
the Commission’s investment in HE policies and on differential domestic fram-
ings of external recommendations. Conceived as facilitators asked to help in 
getting the European message across to the academic audience, the Bologna 
Experts had unequal degrees of leverage, depending on their position within the 
policy process: a limited impact in France versus a proximity to the liberal 
 government after 2007 in Poland, combined with a strong policy involvement in 
the Bologna- inspired HE reforms that were launched during that period. The 
Ukrainian case reveals close links and even, to some extent, an overlap between 
the members of the HERE team and the highest positions in the ministry, albeit 
in a challenging geopolitical and economic context.
 Bologna Experts were by no means selected randomly. Many of them had 
already participated in European Commission programmes such as Tuning, 
Tempus and Erasmus Mundus. Therefore, they were considered as a reliable 
clientele by the Commission. In the Polish and Ukrainian cases, their proximity 
with European working groups and seminars tended to be a resource that could 
be reinvested domestically. But in the French case, the country of the Sorbonne 
declaration and one of the Bologna Process initiators, the same proximity could 
be perceived with suspicion in the Ministry.
 Although their expert status usually pre- dates the Bologna Process, the 
affiliation of Bologna Experts with European networks provides them with 
various types of resources: institutional, symbolic and financial. In Poland and 
Ukraine, the EU’s support to their expert activities influenced their institu-
tional allegiances. The term of ‘co- construction’ of HE policies, involving 
national representatives and EU institutions (Lange and Alexiadou, 2010) 
applies well to these entrepreneurs in these countries. Their ability to combine 
several affiliations allows them to be heard in academia, although they do not 
necessarily hold formal power positions and have often disengaged from 
research activities. But other expert trajectories also evidence a disconnect 
between the Brussels- based stakeholders working closely with the Commission 
and the domestic academic fields.
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Notes
 1 The author would like to thank the organisers and participants of the Decentering 
European Governance workshop, held in Berkeley on 21 April 2017, for their useful 
suggestions and comments on a first version of this chapter.
 2 The interviews (2010–2016) were conducted either in English, French, German, 
Polish or Russian and lasted between one and two hours.
 3 European Commission, press release, ‘The Juncker Commission: A Strong and 
Experienced Team Stands for Change’, Brussels, 10 September 2014, http://europa.
eu/rapid/press- release_IP- 14-984_en.htm
 4 Council of Europe (CoE) archives, Bologna Process, Follow- Up Group Board, 2004 
(file No. 11), Strasbourg, 21 December 2004, Note for the attention of Ms Gabriella 
Battaini- Dragoni, from the Head of Department of Higher Education and History 
Teaching, Mission report, Bologna Board, Oslo, 9 December 2004.
 5 Dorte Kristoffersen, ENQA 10 Years: the History and Development of ENQA, in 
ENQA; 10 Years (2000–2010). A Decade of European Co- operation in Quality 
Assurance in Higher Education, Helsinki, 2010 (Ed. by Fiona Crozier, Nathalie 
Costes, Paula Ranne and Maria Stalter).
 6 Council of Europe (CoE) archives, From Berlin to Bergen, General Report of the 
Bologna Follow- Up Group to the Conference of European Ministers Responsible for 
Higher Education Bergen, 19–20 May 2005, Oslo, 3 May 2005, p. 44.
 7 CoE archives, Bologna Process (no. 15), Bergen Summit, May 2005, Memorandum, 
Strasbourg, 24 May 2005, Note for the attention of G. Battaini Dragoni, Mission 
report, Ministerial conference of the Bologna Process and BFUG, Bergen, 18–20 
May 2005.
 8 On the funding of student organisations, see Klemenčič and Galán Palomares (2017).
 9 CoE archives, From Berlin to Bergen, General report of the Bologna Follow- Up 
Group to the Conference of European Ministers Responsible for Higher Education 
Bergen, 19–20 May 2005 (conference date), Oslo, 3 May 2005 (report published).
10 European Commission, DG Education and Culture, Higher Education Reform 
Experts, https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/erasmus- plus/actions/key- action-3-support- for-
policy- reform/higher- education-reform- experts-heres_en.
11 National Team of Higher Education Reform Experts (HERE) www.tempus.org.ua/en/
national- team-here/sklad- i-zavdanna.html (accessed on 22 August 2016).
12 Adopted by the Council on 7 May 1990, Tempus was extended, in 1993, to the former 
Soviet republics financed by the TACIS programme. It was closed in 2000 for the 
countries associated with the EU but extended to other ex- Yugoslavia and neighbour-
hood countries.
13 Interview with a Polish Bologna Expert, 4 August 2011.
14 González, Julia and Wagenaar, Robert (Eds), La contribution des universités au proc-
essus de Bologne, Tuning/Publications de l’Université Deusto, 2007, p. 9.
15 The members of the group are nominated formally every two to three years. Origin-
ally referred to as ‘Bologna Promoters’, the group was called ‘Bologna Experts’ two 
years later within the EU. The groups encompassed between 9 (Ukraine) and 23 
members (Poland). In all countries, the group includes not only academic teachers but 
also some representatives of students and administrative staff.
16 The analysis presented here is not yet exhaustive. Some members could have different 
functions depending on the time period (for example, one employee of the Ukrainian 
ministry in 2009–2010 became a representative of the Ukrainian employers in 
2011–2014). Student members were usually nominated for one term while the most 
experienced members of the group held their position during several terms. My data-
base includes 30 Ukrainian members, 29 Polish members and 35 French members.
17 Evaluation of the national teams of Bologna Experts – presentation of the final report, 
by Frank Petrikowski, Directorate General for Education and Culture, European 
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 Commission, and Axelle Devaux, Senior Consultant (ICF GHK), 7 November 2012, 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=uR5XeTxvNDA, accessed on 20 September 2018.
18 This was the case of the Yuriy Rashkevych, a Lviv Polytechnic professor, who was 
appointed Deputy Minister for Education and Science in May 2017, and who replaced 
at this highest position another Bologna Expert, the political scientist Inna Sovsun 
(2014–2016), and previously the historian Taras Finikov and the philosopher Evgen 
Sulima (both HEREs). Moreover, the Ukrainian team has included some close aides 
to the minister such as the secretary of state Mihailo Stepko, who was mandated by 
the minister of Education Kremer, in 2004, to negotiate Ukraine’s accession to the 
Bologna Process.
19 Interviews with three Ukrainian education experts, Kyiv, 27 October 2015.
20 One of them was advisor for the Humanities in 2006–2007 in the cabinet of the minister 
delegated for HE and Research François Goulard (2005–2007). One of them has carried 
several functions at the ministry since 2014, was in charge of the Bologna Follow Up 
Group and has worked in the French evaluation agency (AERES). But other members 
with an administrative background represented either public training, cooperation and 
expertise agencies (Agence Universitaire de la Francophonie, Centre International 
d’études pédagogiques) or heads of international cooperation at their HEI.
21 Interview with a Bologna Expert, February 2016; interview with a former French 
Bologna Expert, January 2015.
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